PM Lee reshuffles Cabinet as part of continuing leadership renewal
By Asha Popatlal, Channel NewsAsia | Posted: 26 March 2009 1802 hrs
SINGAPORE : Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has announced several changes to the Cabinet and other appointments, as part of continuing leadership renewal and testing out of younger office holders for broader responsibilities.
Among the major changes is the appointment of the country's first full-fledged woman minister.
Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean will be promoted to Deputy Prime Minister with effect from April 1. He will be one of two deputy prime ministers alongside veteran Wong Kan Seng, who is concurrently the Home Affairs Minister.
Mr Teo will continue as Minister for Defence, and be the acting prime minister in the absence of the prime minister.
Professor S Jayakumar will relinquish his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, and will hold the post of Senior Minister in the Prime Minister's Office alongside Mr Goh Chok Tong. Professor Jayakumar will also continue as Co-ordinating Minister for National Security.
Mr Gan Kim Yong will be appointed Manpower Minister. He is currently the Acting Minister.
Mrs Lim Hwee Hua will hold the post of Minister in the Prime Minister's Office. She will concurrently serve as Second Minister for Finance and Second Minister for Transport.
The last time there was a woman minister in Cabinet was 1991 when Dr Seet Ai Mee became Acting Minister for Community Development. However, she lost her seat that year when she was not returned to Parliament in the 1991 elections.
Senior Minister of State Lui Tuck Yew will be appointed as Acting Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts. He will relinquish his appointment in the Education Ministry.
Dr Lee Boon Yang will relinquish his appointment as Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts and retire from the government.
Since being appointed a Parliamentary Secretary in 1985, Dr Lee has served in many portfolios including Environment, Trade and Industry, Finance, Home Affairs, National Development, Defence, and Manpower, before becoming Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts in 2003.
The prime minister thanked Dr Lee for his many years of service and contributions to the government and the nation.
In changes to the posts of Ministers of State, Mr S Iswaran will be appointed Senior Minister of State in the Education Ministry, in addition to his current post as Senior Minister of State in the Trade and Industry Ministry.
Mr Lee Yi Shyan takes on the role of Minister of State for Manpower, in addition to his present post as Minister of State for Trade and Industry.
Mr Sam Tan will be appointed as Parliamentary Secretary in the Trade and Industry Ministry and Information, Communications and the Arts Ministry. His appointment takes effect on July 1.
Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Community Development, Youth and Sports Teo Ser Luck will be appointed as Mayor of North East Community Development Council with effect from May 31.
The current mayor, Mr Zainul Abidin Rasheed, will relinquish his appointment when his current three-year term ends on May 30. He will continue as Senior Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. - CNA /ls
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Thursday, March 26, 2009
PM renews Cabinet
March 26, 2009
PM renews Cabinet
 |  | Mr Teo Chee Hean (far left) will be appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. Mrs Lim Hwee Hua will be appointed as a Minister in the Prime Minister's Office and concurrently appointed as Second Minister for Finance and Second Minister for Transport. -- ST PHOTOS: BRYAN VAN DER BEEK, WONG KWAI CHOW |
The changes are also to test out younger office holders for broader responsibilities, said a statement from the Prime Minister's Office on Thursday.
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Changes in ministerial appointments
Mr Teo Chee Hean will be appointed as Deputy Prime Minister. He will be the Acting Prime Minister in the absence of the Prime Minister. He will continue as Minister for Defence.
Professor S Jayakumar will relinquish his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister. He will be appointed as Senior Minister in the Prime Minister's Office and will continue as Co-ordinating Minister for National Security. He will also continue to oversee foreign policy matters which cut across different ministries and take charge of foreign policy issues which involve legal negotiation or international adjudication. He continues to chair the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change.
Mr Gan Kim Yong will be appointed as Minister for Manpower.
Mrs Lim Hwee Hua will be appointed as a Minister in the Prime Minister's Office. She will be concurrently appointed as Second Minister for Finance and Second Minister for Transport.
Mr Lui Tuck Yew, Senior Minister of State, will relinquish his appointment in Education and will be appointed as Acting Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts.
Dr Lee Boon Yang will relinquish his appointment as Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts and retire from the Government.
Since being appointed a Parliamentary Secretary in 1985, Dr Lee has served in many portfolios including Environment, Trade and Industry, Finance, Home Affairs, National Development, Defence, and Manpower, before becoming Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts in 2003. The Prime Minister thanks Dr Lee for his many years of service and contributions to the Government and the nation.
Changes in appointment of Ministers of State
Mr S Iswaran will be appointed as Senior Minister of State in the Ministry of Education, concurrent with his present appointment of Senior Minister of State in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Mr Lee Yi Shyan will be appointed as Minister of State in the Ministry of Manpower, concurrent with his present appointment of Minister of State in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
New appointment of Parliamentary Secretary
Mr Sam Tan will be appointed as Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry and concurrently in the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts. His appointment takes effect on 1 July 2009.
Other appointments
Mr Zainul Abidin Rasheed will relinquish his appointment of Mayor, North East Community Development Council when his current 3-year term ends on 30 May 2009. He will continue as Senior Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr Teo Ser Luck will be appointed as Mayor, North East Community Development Council with effect from 31 May 2009. This will be concurrent with his appointment as Senior Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports and in the Ministry of Transport.
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Time to review executive rewards for CEO
Time to review executive rewards for CEOs and political leaders in government-owned companies
In a letter to the Straits Times Forum today, Mr Liew Kai Khiun expressed his outrage at the bonus of $20 million paid to CapitaLand chief executive officer (CEO) Liew Mun Leong . (read letter here)
Mr Liew wrote that “such remuneration concentrated on certain individuals would widen income disparities and demoralise the public by creating a winner-takes-all climate”.
While I do not begrudge CEOs of major corporate companies their due entitlement to a hefy bonus as a reward for their performance, questions must be raised about the salaries and bonuses of government leaders who are holding positions in government-linked companies.
There should be a clear line drawn between the ruling and business classes. The government should not be involved in the corporate sector in the first place.
Since the government is now deeply entrenched in all sectors of Singapore’s economy, it should adopt certain basic standards of corporate governance such as releasing the salaries and bonuses of its top honchos.
To be fair to Mr Liew, he is brave enough to put himself under public scrutiny by declaring the bonuses he received last year.
Capitaland is owned by Temasek Holdings. If Mr Liew received $20 million dollars of bonuses, what about his superior, Madam Ho Ching, the CEO of Temasek?
What is the Madam Ho’s annual salary and will she receive any severance package after leaving Temasek in October this year? Does she deserve any bonuses last year at all for the dismal performance of Temasek?
Her father-in-law Mr Lee Kuan Yew is already receiving an estimated sum of S$3 million dollars a year as the Minister Mentor of Singapore on top of the annual pension he is entitled to receive (if I am not wrong, it is about two-thirds of his annual pay). Is he being paid for as Chairman of GIC and how much were his bonuses, if they are any last year?
Regardless of whether Temasek and GIC are independent corporate entities owned by the Ministry of Finance or the government’s investment vehicles to manage the country’s reserves, either way, they are expected to be accountable to the public.
In major corporate firms, the shareholders decide on the amount of bonuses to be paid to its Chairman. Who determines the bonuses of the GIC Chairman?
Where does GIC and Temasek obtain their funding from? Do they come from the pockets of the Lee family or from every tax-paying citizen of Singapore? Why are Singaporeans being kept in the dark about the salaries and bonuses of its top honchos when we are in fact their paymasters?
I agree with Mr Liew that significant additional taxes should be imposed on individual bonuses of high earners to give the public a greater sense of fairness and decency.
For a start, I propose the government reveal the following information of public interest which is long overdue:
1. The salaries and bonuses of all the staff of GIC and Temasek Holdings.
2. The identities of PAP ministers and MPs who are holding directorships in government-linked companies and their renumeration packages.
3. The assets of all PAP ministers and MPs, including shares owned in government-linked companies and properties.
If the government of Singapore is indeed as incorruptible, transparent and accountable as it often claims, then its leaders should not be afraid to reveal their salaries and bonuses which after all comes from Singapore taxpayers.
How can you expect us to pay for something and yet not tell us how much we are paying for? Are Singaporeans getting a good deal from the government?
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=25110.1
In a letter to the Straits Times Forum today, Mr Liew Kai Khiun expressed his outrage at the bonus of $20 million paid to CapitaLand chief executive officer (CEO) Liew Mun Leong . (read letter here)
Mr Liew wrote that “such remuneration concentrated on certain individuals would widen income disparities and demoralise the public by creating a winner-takes-all climate”.
While I do not begrudge CEOs of major corporate companies their due entitlement to a hefy bonus as a reward for their performance, questions must be raised about the salaries and bonuses of government leaders who are holding positions in government-linked companies.
There should be a clear line drawn between the ruling and business classes. The government should not be involved in the corporate sector in the first place.
Since the government is now deeply entrenched in all sectors of Singapore’s economy, it should adopt certain basic standards of corporate governance such as releasing the salaries and bonuses of its top honchos.
To be fair to Mr Liew, he is brave enough to put himself under public scrutiny by declaring the bonuses he received last year.
Capitaland is owned by Temasek Holdings. If Mr Liew received $20 million dollars of bonuses, what about his superior, Madam Ho Ching, the CEO of Temasek?
What is the Madam Ho’s annual salary and will she receive any severance package after leaving Temasek in October this year? Does she deserve any bonuses last year at all for the dismal performance of Temasek?
Her father-in-law Mr Lee Kuan Yew is already receiving an estimated sum of S$3 million dollars a year as the Minister Mentor of Singapore on top of the annual pension he is entitled to receive (if I am not wrong, it is about two-thirds of his annual pay). Is he being paid for as Chairman of GIC and how much were his bonuses, if they are any last year?
Regardless of whether Temasek and GIC are independent corporate entities owned by the Ministry of Finance or the government’s investment vehicles to manage the country’s reserves, either way, they are expected to be accountable to the public.
In major corporate firms, the shareholders decide on the amount of bonuses to be paid to its Chairman. Who determines the bonuses of the GIC Chairman?
Where does GIC and Temasek obtain their funding from? Do they come from the pockets of the Lee family or from every tax-paying citizen of Singapore? Why are Singaporeans being kept in the dark about the salaries and bonuses of its top honchos when we are in fact their paymasters?
I agree with Mr Liew that significant additional taxes should be imposed on individual bonuses of high earners to give the public a greater sense of fairness and decency.
For a start, I propose the government reveal the following information of public interest which is long overdue:
1. The salaries and bonuses of all the staff of GIC and Temasek Holdings.
2. The identities of PAP ministers and MPs who are holding directorships in government-linked companies and their renumeration packages.
3. The assets of all PAP ministers and MPs, including shares owned in government-linked companies and properties.
If the government of Singapore is indeed as incorruptible, transparent and accountable as it often claims, then its leaders should not be afraid to reveal their salaries and bonuses which after all comes from Singapore taxpayers.
How can you expect us to pay for something and yet not tell us how much we are paying for? Are Singaporeans getting a good deal from the government?
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=25110.1
So, what did change?
So, what did change?
Associate Professor Bilveer Singh from NUS political science department says, "Temasek is a strategically important company and for a foreigner to manage it can be seen as humiliating". Although the truth may truly be that "there (is) nobody inside Temasek equal to the job", the appointment of Charles Goodyear as the CEO of Temasek Holdings is most certainly a negative development.
Mr. Dhanabalan rightly remarked in 2002 that sensitive job of Temasek's CEO is not for foreigners. Even while being led by a Singaporean, larger and larger proportion of assets were invested in the financial sector by Temasek Holdings; supposedly spurred by foreign advise. Besides worrying if our CPF funds have disappeared with GIC's and Temasek's recent losses, one cannot help but also wonder "what now since not just the advisors are foreign but the lead person himself is a foreigner?
Senior Minister of State for Finance Lim Hwee Hua in addressing this recently in parliament, remarked, "Temasek today is completely different from the Temasek at the time of Mr Dhanabalan's". What she failed to address was, "So, what did change?"
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=25109.1
Associate Professor Bilveer Singh from NUS political science department says, "Temasek is a strategically important company and for a foreigner to manage it can be seen as humiliating". Although the truth may truly be that "there (is) nobody inside Temasek equal to the job", the appointment of Charles Goodyear as the CEO of Temasek Holdings is most certainly a negative development.
Mr. Dhanabalan rightly remarked in 2002 that sensitive job of Temasek's CEO is not for foreigners. Even while being led by a Singaporean, larger and larger proportion of assets were invested in the financial sector by Temasek Holdings; supposedly spurred by foreign advise. Besides worrying if our CPF funds have disappeared with GIC's and Temasek's recent losses, one cannot help but also wonder "what now since not just the advisors are foreign but the lead person himself is a foreigner?
Senior Minister of State for Finance Lim Hwee Hua in addressing this recently in parliament, remarked, "Temasek today is completely different from the Temasek at the time of Mr Dhanabalan's". What she failed to address was, "So, what did change?"
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=25109.1
Money Does Buy Happiness
Money Does Buy Happiness
Professor Lee Wei Ling, on subject of disquiet about the amendment before Parliament to reimburse organ donors, fingered public-sector renal physicians and transplant surgeons as the spoilers, positing that “they are more concerned about being treated as pariahs by international or American medical societies of their specialities.”Merriam-Webster defines the word as such:
- Main Entry: pa·ri·ah
Pronunciation: \pə-ˈrī-ə\
Function: noun
Etymology: Tamil par_aiyan, literally, drummer
Date: 1613
1 : a member of a low caste of southern India
2 : one that is despised or rejected : outcast
Speaking up for the Singapore Urological Association, Professor E.Kesavan first pointed out that the majority of their members are in private practice. He then highlighted that unpaid volunteers surgeons within their membership have supported the national transplantation programme for more than 20 years, without any thought of recognition or reward. Needless to say they take umbrage at the insinuation that these doctors place their interests before those of the community, “as was implied in the (Lee’s) letter.” But why the pariah label?
Perhaps Lee missed out on the crucial argument against the amendment, which is that the new law lacked details to regulate payment amounts, to ensure that it is kept “not-for-profit, transparent and devoid of abuse,” to quote dissenting PAP MP Christppher de Souza. NCMP Sylvia Lim put it more starkly: “The new formula leaves room for profit.” In particular she referred to a clause that allows for defraying or reimbursing costs which may include travel, accommodation, cost of domestic or child care, loss of income and long-term-medical care. One could almost hear Vivian Balakrishnan query the accommmodation - is it 5-star, budget hotel or rent-by the-hour? Unvoiced in parliament, but probably lurking in the minds of everybody inside and outside the house, is the explained mechanism of how retail tycoon Tang Wee Sung jumped the queue for his organ transplant, and so soon after he was convicted for illegally buying a kidney from a Indonesian.
The way Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan brushed aside the concerns about reimbursement caps or formulae by stating that he preferred not to “hardwire technical matters” into the act leads only to further misgivings about potential abuse. Like most legislations in Singapore, there is this provision: “at the Minister’s pleasure.” It is no comfort that the proposed crucial gatekeepers will be the hospital’s transplant ethics committee, probably the same committee that approved the harvesting of the Indonesia sourced kidney for Tang in the first place.
Khaw made it clear on aspect of compensation: Foreign donors will get a “much lower reimbursement cap,” due to the lower cost of living in their home countries. In other words, forget about a kidney from America, United Kingdom or Japan; sourcing from pariahs is much cheaper. If you got the cash, anything is for sale - even a heart.
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What Sun Tzu might have done if he was in Singapore politics instead
What Sun Tzu might have done if he was in Singapore politics instead
SINGAPORE - What do Tiong Bahru Group Representation Constituency (GRC), Cheng San GRC and Eunos GRC have in common? First and foremost, they were the scenes of closely contested electoral battles, which saw the opposition losing by thin margins. And, the three of them are now defunct, at least they are now part of the chapter within the annals of Singapore’s electoral history. The same goes for Braddell Heights, Anson and other Single Member Constituencies (SMC). It isn’t a big mystery that these constituencies are consolidated within a GRC helmed by a PAP minister.
And it goes without saying that the PAP were beneficiaries after their disappearance. Undoubtedly, the opposition was derailed by it. When boundaries shift, i.e. when an opposition stronghold is integrated with another PAP-supporting area, the odds of winning decreases significantly, more so if the GRC is helmed by a heavyweight minister. And this is further exacerbated by the fact that the election deposits keeps increasing all over the years. During the last General Elections, the election deposit for every candidate was a whopping $13500.
However, does the PAP always gets its way? The fact remains that an opposition stronghold is after all an opposition stronghold assuming the residents are not re-located. And this could end up being a minor shot in the PAP’s foot. Recall during the General Elections of 2006, expectations of Mr Lee Hsien Loong winning by a huge margin was high, at least from the PAP’s perpective because they were pitted against a team of newcomers from the Worker’s Party. There was even some talk of the newcomers losing their electoral deposits.
Thus, the billion dollar question before every election is how has the boundaries changed as compared to the last elections. And, it is understandably easy to get carried away with worrying about the boundary changes as the opposition candidates are likely to weigh their chances.”
What the PAP couldn’t count on was the Cheng San bogeyman lying in wait at Ang Mo Kio GRC (Ang Mo Kio GRC absorbed Cheng San GRC). The results? Mr Lee turned in an average performance relative to his party mates, and couldn’t meet his expectation of “completely thrashing his opponents”. Arguably, the results at Ang Mo Kio could be attributed partly to the Cheng San effect. Of course, there were other factors that could have influenced the outcome too.
Thus, the billion dollar question before every election is how has the boundaries changed as compared to the last elections. And, it is understandably easy to get carried away with worrying about the boundary changes as the opposition candidates are likely to weigh their chances.
The changes are so unpredictable that it is futile attempting to predict the changes in boundaries. What can the opposition do about it? Nothing, and why they should even bother? The most basic, yet prudent move by the opposition will be to build on their influence around these stronghold areas, and this should start immediately after the current election in preparation for the next one. Thus, the opposition should be setting up “base camps” in such areas to consolidate their support and spread their influence, instead of worrying about the new boundaries. And if they manage to set up a massive sphere of influence, no amount of massive re-drawing is going to give the PAP any advantage.
And there are potential stronghold sites where the opposition can establish their “base camps”, all of which saw close fights in previous years. Cheng San, Eunos, Tiong Bahru, Anson, Braddell Heights, Aljunied, Changi, Fengshan, Paya Lebar, Bukit Batok and others have received 40% or more votes for the opposition. Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong are prime examples of candidates who successfully build their “base camps” in their stronghold, although it could be argued that the dynamics of competition in a GRC is far more complex than that of an SMC. That being said, there is no harm expanding the sphere of influence within a stronghold, no?
Although, the re-drawing of boundaries may technically disadvantage the opposition, this can be negated if the opposition adopts the appropriate strategy. Even Sun Tzu himself said:”The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.” And this position that Sun Tzu speaks about is the sphere of influence radiating from the opposition’s stronghold.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/n/mb/message.asp?webtag=sunkopitiam&msg=25190.1
SINGAPORE - What do Tiong Bahru Group Representation Constituency (GRC), Cheng San GRC and Eunos GRC have in common? First and foremost, they were the scenes of closely contested electoral battles, which saw the opposition losing by thin margins. And, the three of them are now defunct, at least they are now part of the chapter within the annals of Singapore’s electoral history. The same goes for Braddell Heights, Anson and other Single Member Constituencies (SMC). It isn’t a big mystery that these constituencies are consolidated within a GRC helmed by a PAP minister.
And it goes without saying that the PAP were beneficiaries after their disappearance. Undoubtedly, the opposition was derailed by it. When boundaries shift, i.e. when an opposition stronghold is integrated with another PAP-supporting area, the odds of winning decreases significantly, more so if the GRC is helmed by a heavyweight minister. And this is further exacerbated by the fact that the election deposits keeps increasing all over the years. During the last General Elections, the election deposit for every candidate was a whopping $13500.
However, does the PAP always gets its way? The fact remains that an opposition stronghold is after all an opposition stronghold assuming the residents are not re-located. And this could end up being a minor shot in the PAP’s foot. Recall during the General Elections of 2006, expectations of Mr Lee Hsien Loong winning by a huge margin was high, at least from the PAP’s perpective because they were pitted against a team of newcomers from the Worker’s Party. There was even some talk of the newcomers losing their electoral deposits.
Thus, the billion dollar question before every election is how has the boundaries changed as compared to the last elections. And, it is understandably easy to get carried away with worrying about the boundary changes as the opposition candidates are likely to weigh their chances.”
What the PAP couldn’t count on was the Cheng San bogeyman lying in wait at Ang Mo Kio GRC (Ang Mo Kio GRC absorbed Cheng San GRC). The results? Mr Lee turned in an average performance relative to his party mates, and couldn’t meet his expectation of “completely thrashing his opponents”. Arguably, the results at Ang Mo Kio could be attributed partly to the Cheng San effect. Of course, there were other factors that could have influenced the outcome too.
Thus, the billion dollar question before every election is how has the boundaries changed as compared to the last elections. And, it is understandably easy to get carried away with worrying about the boundary changes as the opposition candidates are likely to weigh their chances.
The changes are so unpredictable that it is futile attempting to predict the changes in boundaries. What can the opposition do about it? Nothing, and why they should even bother? The most basic, yet prudent move by the opposition will be to build on their influence around these stronghold areas, and this should start immediately after the current election in preparation for the next one. Thus, the opposition should be setting up “base camps” in such areas to consolidate their support and spread their influence, instead of worrying about the new boundaries. And if they manage to set up a massive sphere of influence, no amount of massive re-drawing is going to give the PAP any advantage.
And there are potential stronghold sites where the opposition can establish their “base camps”, all of which saw close fights in previous years. Cheng San, Eunos, Tiong Bahru, Anson, Braddell Heights, Aljunied, Changi, Fengshan, Paya Lebar, Bukit Batok and others have received 40% or more votes for the opposition. Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong are prime examples of candidates who successfully build their “base camps” in their stronghold, although it could be argued that the dynamics of competition in a GRC is far more complex than that of an SMC. That being said, there is no harm expanding the sphere of influence within a stronghold, no?
Although, the re-drawing of boundaries may technically disadvantage the opposition, this can be negated if the opposition adopts the appropriate strategy. Even Sun Tzu himself said:”The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.” And this position that Sun Tzu speaks about is the sphere of influence radiating from the opposition’s stronghold.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/n/mb/message.asp?webtag=sunkopitiam&msg=25190.1
An Uphill Task
An Uphill Task
Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan is taking flak again, this time for ramming through a legislation that is so blatantly lacking in details to prevent abuse that it practically screams: “Rape me”. But should we fault Khaw for the incompleteness or the legal team who drafted the law?
Khaw is one of the few Ministers that will not make you puke your breakfast, or prompt one to associate the arrogance, incompetence and greed trait with some party other than AIG.
He was last lambasted for abandoning the elderly offshore when he talked about the option of sending them to nursing homes in Johore Baru. The spirit of his message is clearer when you listen to his delivery in this video.
However, the clarification posted on the Ministry of Health (MOH) website brings back that sickening feeling in the stomach that the sincerity of the government initiative is suspect.
“We should try, but it would be a challenge. According to the Singapore investor in an upcoming nursing home in JB, his total cost for putting up the facility of 200 beds, including land, was estimated at S$10 million. This is less than the cost of putting up an outpatient polyclinic in Singapore, even excluding land cost.
And it is not just capital cost. Nursing homes are labour intensive. The wages of nurses here are more than double the wages in JB.”
It is mind boggling, to borrow Khaw’s own words, that an outpatient polyclinic can cost $10 million. But has anyone asked why the Singapore polyclinic has need of frills like flat screen displays in the waiting areas? Ever notice the fancy computers and PDAs the doctors are using? And there are the layers of overpaid civil service staff tugged away behind closed doors, racking up brownie points for 8 month performance bonuses. If ever land cost is added to the equation, you can bet it will be marked-to-market, just like the way Dhanabalan used opportunity cost to explain away the market level pricing of HDB flats.
The gross perversion of the truth here is that “the wages of nurses are more than double the wages in JB.” A well run nursing home in Singapore that charges the higher end rate of $2,000 a month employs Filipina nursing help at around $500. Proficiency in English is essential for dispensing daily medication. Cleaners
from Myanmar and China are probably paid less. The “in-house” doctor is Singaporean, but his consultation charges are a $40 extra, cost of medicines excluded. You don’t want to know the about the quality and quantities of the staffing in cheaper nursing homes here.
Khaw may be trying to do his best within the constraints of the government budget, a budget that allocates more taxpayers’ dollars to military toys like F-15 Eagles ($40 million each, depending on configuration) and Leopard tanks (estimated $13 million each for refurbished ones).
http://forums.delphiforums.com/n/mb/message.asp?webtag=sunkopitiam&msg=25185.1
Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan is taking flak again, this time for ramming through a legislation that is so blatantly lacking in details to prevent abuse that it practically screams: “Rape me”. But should we fault Khaw for the incompleteness or the legal team who drafted the law?
Khaw is one of the few Ministers that will not make you puke your breakfast, or prompt one to associate the arrogance, incompetence and greed trait with some party other than AIG.
He was last lambasted for abandoning the elderly offshore when he talked about the option of sending them to nursing homes in Johore Baru. The spirit of his message is clearer when you listen to his delivery in this video.
However, the clarification posted on the Ministry of Health (MOH) website brings back that sickening feeling in the stomach that the sincerity of the government initiative is suspect.
“We should try, but it would be a challenge. According to the Singapore investor in an upcoming nursing home in JB, his total cost for putting up the facility of 200 beds, including land, was estimated at S$10 million. This is less than the cost of putting up an outpatient polyclinic in Singapore, even excluding land cost.
And it is not just capital cost. Nursing homes are labour intensive. The wages of nurses here are more than double the wages in JB.”
It is mind boggling, to borrow Khaw’s own words, that an outpatient polyclinic can cost $10 million. But has anyone asked why the Singapore polyclinic has need of frills like flat screen displays in the waiting areas? Ever notice the fancy computers and PDAs the doctors are using? And there are the layers of overpaid civil service staff tugged away behind closed doors, racking up brownie points for 8 month performance bonuses. If ever land cost is added to the equation, you can bet it will be marked-to-market, just like the way Dhanabalan used opportunity cost to explain away the market level pricing of HDB flats.
The gross perversion of the truth here is that “the wages of nurses are more than double the wages in JB.” A well run nursing home in Singapore that charges the higher end rate of $2,000 a month employs Filipina nursing help at around $500. Proficiency in English is essential for dispensing daily medication. Cleaners
from Myanmar and China are probably paid less. The “in-house” doctor is Singaporean, but his consultation charges are a $40 extra, cost of medicines excluded. You don’t want to know the about the quality and quantities of the staffing in cheaper nursing homes here.
Khaw may be trying to do his best within the constraints of the government budget, a budget that allocates more taxpayers’ dollars to military toys like F-15 Eagles ($40 million each, depending on configuration) and Leopard tanks (estimated $13 million each for refurbished ones).
http://forums.delphiforums.com/n/mb/message.asp?webtag=sunkopitiam&msg=25185.1
Singapore's shame 0: Introduction to Self-censorship
Introduction to Self-censorship: Singapore’s shame
James Gomez
Even though a variety of global incidents such as the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the 2001 September 11 incident, SARS, the global financial meltdown of 2008 have been touted at varies times as catalysts for political change
in the region, the wave of democratization has yet to reach Singapore’s shores.
Singapore remains one of the few countries in Southeast Asia that has not witnessed meaningful political reform that can lead to regime change. This is not from a want of effort over the years by a range of activists from all walks of life.
Apart from being persecuted by the PAP government, these activists have not been able to stir the citizens into mass democratic action, because most people in Singapore self-censor themselves and censor others who are sympathetic to the democratic process.
Many Singaporeans disillusioned with the state of political development in the city-state have increasingly opted to emigrate, but they are being replaced by the PAP government with new citizens and resident workers who buy into this self-censorial, hence ensuring there is a dominant political culture in Singapore that will not facilitate democratization.
Numerous commentators have noted that the structural constraints of Singapore’s political system are responsible for hindered political development in the Republic. Its geographical size as well as the penetration and domination of the ruling Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) in all sectors of society have been cited as reasons. Control is almost complete.
The party has over the years placed many of its political allies both local and foreign in elite positions. It has grown to such proportions as to become an oligarchy. It is not a political party in the traditional sense. It has merged government, state structures and para-political organisations, and has co-opted and sponsored civil society actors.
The new area of co-option is the integration of foreign residents in Singapore as well as foreign governmental representatives to buy into the PAP style of managing Singapore. Such explanations of the PAP’s hegemony have been often supplemented with examples of the party’s encroachment of civil and political rights and its acts of persecution.
It has been noted that opposition politicians and selected members of civil society have suffered detention without trial, defamation suits, the application of tax evasion charges and others less visible methods of pressures that operate in the background such as denial of job opportunities.
Since 2000, the PAP has also opened a new front to respond to the small but increasing acts of online and offline civil disobedience acts. Through the PAP`s persecution, repressive methods and techniques, livelihoods and careers of activists have been broken and destroyed.
The net impact is that many of these activists have become disillusioned and dropped out of the scene. Such actions by the PAP government have also kept away a substantial number people from stepping forward to take on the regime. Collectively, these repressive features are regularly offered by commentators as explanations why the pace of political liberalisation in Singapore has been slow.
As a result, discussions on political development often center on sharing political governance. The PAP is often placed at one while on the other, actors such as opposition parties, civil society or individuals are lined up
as contenders for political and policy influence.
The ruling party’s reluctance to share governance in real political terms has been offered as the main impediment towards reform, in particular in the area of electoral reform. The PAP is the foremost feature on people`s minds when they speak of political development.
There is a failure to see and acknowledge that after nearly five decades of centralised rule, there has developed among the citizenry (and a majority of new citizens and resident workers buy into this), a censorial political culture that acts as an equally important obstruction.
The structural constraints and punitive actions that impact on the people’s behaviour have not been adequately recorded and debated. Neither have the people’s culture perpetuating the very features that support restrictions against alternative political expression and action similarly considered.
This focus on the people and how they contribute to the state of political conservatism in Singapore is an important variable for analysts and activists to ponder alike. This feature of political culture to some extent determines the success or failure of political endeavours by individuals or groups. Thus, an in-depth understanding of the people’s behaviour is vital in formulating any strategy for political action.
The prevalence of this self-censorial culture among the elite and the masses shows how the PAP administrative state has, over the decades, been able to effectively expand its control over the hearts and minds of its citizens. It has been able to foster a self-censorial political culture that can also be similarly seen in countries in the region such as Burma, China, Laos and Vietnam which are either one-party states or military dictatorships.
I thought in my initial analysis in 1999 that this Singaporean political culture was unique not only to the region but also unique globally. In spite of similarities elsewhere I continue to hold this view. For me, in the Singapore case, it is the paradoxical combination of high economic growth, small size, modernity, global outlook, high inflow of foreigners, and a technically non-communist political system that makes it stand out from the authoritarian regimes.
The oil rich Middle-Eastern or Muslim states, dictatorship and military commands in Latin America and Africa, the
remaining communist regimes scattered around the world and the countries listed above in the region where self-censorship also prevails do not have these similar features as Singapore.
The emergence of a dominant one party state and its harsh response to alternative political viewpoints and action has fostered a negative perception towards political expression over the year in Singapore. Even with the arrival of the internet in Singapore since the late 1990s such negative perception also holds true to some extent to online political
expressions especially when they are brought into the offline world.
This situation causes the majority of the people to see individuals and groups engaged in alternative political discourses as illegitimate beings, not to be encouraged but stopped or sidelined. Such an attitude is manifested through the people’s act of self-censorship and/or the censorship of others.
Given this backdrop, in the immediate short to mid-term, broad-based political support from the ground for a progressive politics in Singapore remains weak. While the internet has provided a new platform, and there has
been some growth in political expression and action, the more progressive elements are unable to garner mass public support.
The self-censorial political culture prefers to err on the side of caution and support the more conservative portion of these elements. Support for alternative political action such as civil disobedience remains weak and sporadic. There is some space to articulate a political problem, draw attention to it, and perhaps even make suggestions for change. However this remains at the level of rhetoric, taking place on “sponsored” or “non-partisan” platforms, and is
restricted to calls for a civil society to operate within the boundaries of the current law.
Even within civil society this space is heavily constricted by the laws of the self-censorial political culture that penetrates and operates there very effectively among its various sectional interests. Although discussion,
criticism and activism related to explicit political issues such as human rights, the electoral system, opposition political parties and the constitution (almost non-existent in Singapore along non-political party
lines ten years ago) are now more evident with the arrival of the internet, the pressure is to pursue it along “non-partisan” lines.
Singapore`s civil society is held ransom by a bunch of offline pre-internet activists weaned on the philosophy of non-partisanship who immediately counsel individuals associated with new online initiatives through their tea and advice sessions. When die-hard new and old activists reject such measures, these advocates run the risk of immediate censorship (nowadays done more subtly), rejection, marginalisation and name-calling. Given these dynamics of political culture attitude and behaviour, the political system continues to be upheld in its censorial form.
Under these circumstances, political change in Singapore cannot be expected if any strategy towards this end opts to target citizens. Instead, it would be more effective to focus on needs of a small group of political progressives and construct some kind of platform for this group to articulate its vision. In 1999, this resulted in the founding of the Think Centre. The aim then was to create political awareness.
While the Centre made some gains and set the pace and tone for online-offline activism in the early years, the Think Centre has been unable to hold its own as a multi-partisan political NGO in Singapore. In this regard it has succumbed to the offline pressures of non-partisanship. Due to internal limitations it has gone off tangent to its original purpose and aims (which is off course the prerogative of its caretakers) and has been either unable or unwilling to execute a change of leadership at the helm (since I stepped down).
Singapore`s political civil and political landscape has since changed. To move any new political agenda forward it is now important and necessary to draw support from like-minded sympathisers and partners to explore strategies for political engagement in a change environment.
In 1999 when I broached the idea of setting up a political NGO it seemed a catch like 22 situation - asking people to take risks in a politically punitive environment. At that time I felt such a strategy was nevertheless important in the long-term for the creation of greater political space and the interim, it could provide the means for like-minded people to form their own political community.
Since then the situation has changed. A set of people in the last ten years have come forward, taken a political stand and have acted upon them on a civil society platform. What is needed now is an organisation or network of people with activist experience from a broad spectrum of backgrounds, issues and organisational experience including those who have been active some 20 years ago to led the way forward. Such an entity needs to go beyond local politics and think globally in terms of its network and reach for democratization in Singapore. Such a move is important, as Singapore needs to widen the pool of people who will be politically creative and innovative enough to carry the country into the next century.
The absence of a risk-taking class at the philosophical and political level is a key problem. The PAP government’s call for the people to be active and to take matters into their own hands has not taken off the ground due mainly to the censorial behaviour of the majority and reluctance on the part of the PAP to endorse the legitimate co-existence of
political difference.
Over the years a small group of people have been successful in gaining legitimacy for their alternative philosophical and political expression but they do have to face a conservative majority that constantly tries to censor
difference.
That there is a need for a risk-taking culture to permeate the political and social infrastructure of Singapore is clear and some have taken this risk. But at the same time is important that if we want to succeed that such an organization or network is well managed and run by individuals who are clearly aware that even in politics, professionalism and
commitment to deliverables are important qualities to determine success. This is the important feature for the next phase for Singapore`s political society.
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