China's soft power

China's soft power; Dwight H. Perkins reviews Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World.

by Perkins, Dwight H.

Harvard International Review • Fall, 2007 •

Much is made today of China's booming economy. US defense secretaries point to China's rising military power and question why China feels the need to build its military might so rapidly. US diplomats work with Chinese diplomats in an effort to defuse the North Korean nuclear crisis. These measures are covered extensively in the world press. In contrast, China's global involvement in a number of other areas tends to receive comparatively little attention from either the press or from US and European political leaders and scholars.

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Joshua Kurlantzick, who has reported from Asia for journals such as US News and World Report and The Economist, focuses his book, Charm Offensive, on a broad array of China's activities beyond its borders. The book emphasizes what Kurlantznick calls China's "soft power," but he uses the term differently from how Joseph Nye, the originator of the term, defines it. Nye uses the term to refer to the influence that nations exert beyond their borders through everything from their music and cinema to their role as models of freedom and democratic governance. On the other hand, economic and military power represent "hard power."

By contrast, Kurlantzick includes China's trade and overseas investment in his definition of soft power. Furthermore, while much of the United States' soft power comes from the activities of private individuals and media portrayals of the nature of US society, this book is focused on Chinese government activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As Kurlantzick points out, the United States has squandered much of its soft power through its misguided policies in the Middle East and its penchant for unilateralism, while Chinese influence has steadily grown.

But for what purpose is China using its charm offensive? The days when China's interests beyond its borders focused on revolutionary movements against established governments are long gone. Nor in any immediate sense is China threatened by possible military attack from a superpower, as it was in the 1970s from the USSR or in the 1960s from US military involvement in Vietnam. China's response to those perceived threats was not to expand its diplomatic efforts and win friends around the world. Instead, China built a "people's militia" designed to fight a guerilla war on an unprecedented scale, and it invested vast sums to move industry into its mountainous interior where it might resist potential air attacks.

China's current charm offensive focuses on winning friends abroad to achieve several concrete objectives. Its top objective, after securing its territory from external attack, is to isolate Taiwan and eventually achieve the island's political reintegration with the Chinese mainland. China relies on a variety of economic and diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan. In Africa and Latin America, China holds out the prospects of investment, foreign aid, and its large domestic market. Taiwan also offers foreign aid and technical assistance to those who maintain diplomatic ties with it, but it has nothing comparable to the lure of the booming Chinese mainland market.

Beyond Taiwan, China's overseas objectives involve a major economic and diplomatic effort to secure natural resources like oil and copper for its booming economy. This involves everything from securing long-term contracts with resource suppliers to directly investing in and owning these suppliers. The diplomatic component, among other actions, involves befriending resource-rich nations that the United States and others see as pariahs. With its policy of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of other nations, China counters efforts by the United States and others to isolate countries such as Sudan, Iran, and Zimbabwe. China also cultivates friendships with nations such as Venezuela that currently have unfriendly relations with the United States, but in doing so, it is careful not to appear to divert oil supplies from the US market. Relations with developing countries, as China's low-key policy toward Venezuela indicates, do not trump China's high priority needs to avoid military confrontation and keep the US market open to Chinese exports.

A third objective of the charm offensive is to gradually supplant the United States and Japan as major influences around China's borders. Kurlantzick rightly points out the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, through which China has greatly strengthened its relations with the Central Asian republics that were formerly part of the USSR. His discussion of Chinese influence in Burma, however, may be an even better example of China's success in establishing itself as the dominant player around its borders. The Burma policies of the United States and much of Europe, well-intentioned as they may be, have had the effect of removing most US and European influence from Burma for nearly two decades. As a result, China has had the field largely to itself. Because of China's massive business and diplomatic presence, Burma is not at all isolated in areas where it wants to be open, including the economy. However, it is isolated in precisely those areas where it is happy to eschew foreign contact, notably those of human rights and democratization.

Kurlantznick pays special attention to China's warm relations with Thailand. In its dealings with Thailand, according to Kurlantznick, one sees the full range of Chinese soft power. Thai legislators are regularly invited for tours of China, while the Confucius Institute (China's equivalent of the German Goethe-Institute or the US Information Agency) runs courses in Chinese for Thais. Moreover, overseas Chinese in Thailand--who compose most of the Thai business community and a large portion of the Bangkok population--are often courted to invest in China.

This book does a good job of describing the full range of China's efforts to win friends and gain influence overseas, as it does with Thailand. It is less effective, however, in putting these activities in a more complete context. Thailand, for example, is the one country in Southeast Asia where the ethnic Chinese minority is fully integrated into local society. Thailand also has a nearly two centuries-old policy of balancing foreign powers against each other. In the past, these powers were Britain and France, while today they are the United States and China. The charm offensive has helped China's cause, but, in my opinion, is not the main force behind the strengthening Thai-Chinese relationship.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, China's relationship with local Chinese minorities can be a mixed blessing. In Malaysia and Indonesia, politicians sometimes play on the Malay population's fear and dislike of the Chinese minority. Vietnam today has "friendly" relations with China. Yet its history, from a local point of view, is mostly a story of a thousand years of Chinese rule, followed by achieved independence and periodic wars to preserve it; the most recent war of that type was fought in 1979. Kurlantznick does not ignore this fact, but he often depicts the charm offensive in unqualified form and then presents the caveats much later.

Chinese advances abroad, however, are as much a product of US missteps as they are of Chinese accomplishments. For all of China's interests in acquiring natural resources and strengthening ties to its neighbors, dealing directly with the United States in a wide range of areas is China's top foreign policy priority. It is no accident that the current foreign minister and his predecessor had both first been ambassadors to the United States. As Kurlantzick points out, China's successes in weakening US positions around the world are often a direct result of mistakes by the US, ranging from unilateralism to its failure to even try to understand Middle Eastern societies on their own terms. I happen to agree with his generally very negative view of recent US foreign policy, but I doubt that non-partisan readers will find this a balanced critique. Yet his proposed changes to US foreign policy, which range from emphasizing multilateralism over unilateralism to rebuilding the US public diplomacy apparatus, are unlikely to be seen as controversial, except perhaps in neo-conservative circles.

While the points made in this book are not always argued as rigorously as one might hope, this is still the first book to describe in some depth the full range of China's efforts to gain friends and exert influence on the rest of the world. Its descriptions and analyses are readily accessible to the general reader with interest in foreign policy, and specialists will learn from it as well.

DWIGHT H. PERKINS is the Harold Hitchings Burbank Research Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University. Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World is by Joshua Kurlantznick (Yale University Press, 2007).

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Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia (Part II)

Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia (Part II)
By Josh Kurlantzick | Tuesday, July 03, 2007

As demonstrated by the worldwide diffusion of Chinese language, culture and policies, China has successfully marshaled its soft power — particularly among developing nations. But as Josh Kurlantzick writes, China must recognize that its growing clout may eventually engender hostility — especially in Southeast Asia.

In the short term, China has enjoyed significant success with its charm offensive. As one Southeast Asian diplomat notes, it is almost impossible now to hear any Southeast Asian leaders question China’s rise, a sharp contrast from ten years ago.

Indeed, polling data (from organizations like the Program on International Policy Attitudes) show publics in most nations now have a positive impression of China — and the country is usually viewed more positively than the United States.

Growing Chinese popularity

And these trends are not limited to the developing world. Even in Australia, a longtime U.S. ally, polls taken by

While Wen Jiabao was toasted during a visit in 2003 to Indonesia with frequent ovations, when President Bush visited Indonesia the same year, many Indonesian cultural and political leaders would not even meet with him.

the Lowy Institute, a respected research organization, suggest that the Australian public now views China as favorably as the United States.

The public sentiment is reflected in Chinese language and cultural studies, which have skyrocketed in popularity in the developing world. Between 2002 and 2004, the number of Cambodian students in China grew by nearly 20%, while the number of Indonesians rose nearly 50% and the number of Vietnamese rose nearly 90%.

Chinese businesspeople and policymakers, meanwhile, are increasingly given the type of welcome and access in developing nations that once was reserved for U.S. and Japanese elites.

Following China's policies

Sometimes they receive grander welcomes. While visiting Indonesia in 2003, Wen Jiabao was toasted with frequent ovations. In contrast, when President Bush visited Indonesia the same year, many Indonesian cultural and political leaders would not even meet with him.

In places like Algeria, Nigeria or Vietnam, meanwhile, local policymakers seem convinced that if they learn from China, they could duplicate China’s success in promoting development and combating poverty.

In Vietnam, for example, younger policy makers study the “Chinese model” of development — the model of slowly opening the economy while retaining control of the political system.

Correct use of power

What will China’s charm offensive mean in the long run?

Still a developing country itself, China could overplay its hand, making the kind of promises on aid and investment that it cannot fulfill.

There are signs China’s engagement with the world will prompt Beijing to wield its soft influence responsibly.

China has begun to mediate other nations’ disputes, as it did when Thailand and Cambodia nearly came to war in 2003. What’s more, some of China’s soft power hardly comes at the United States' expense.

The United States remains the major investor in the developing world, and it stands as the biggest source of foreign film, television, popular music and books around the globe.

Selfish attitude

But as China’s soft power grows, it could begin to encounter blowback against it. As China becomes more powerful, other nations will begin to see beyond its benign face to a more complicated reality.

They will realize that despite China’s promises of noninterference, when it comes to core interests, China — like any great power — will think of itself first.

China could create blowback against itself in other ways, too. Still a developing country itself, China could overplay its hand, making the kind of promises on aid and investment that it cannot fulfill.

China’s exporting of its own poor standards on labor issues, the environment and corporate governance could also foster blowback against Beijing.

Many problems

In one recent ranking of

Despite China’s promises of noninterference, when it comes to core interests China, like any great power, will think of itself first.

eighty nations’ adherence to corporate responsibility, China placed 66th, well below other developing economies like India.

And in the long run, if countries like Burma ever made the transition to freer governments, China could face a sizable backlash for its past support for their authoritarian rulers. “We know who stands behind the [Burmese] government,” one Burmese businessman told me last year. “We’ll remember.”

Editor's Note: This feature is adapted from Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World by Josh Kurlantzick. Copyright 2007, Yale University Press. Reprinted with permission of the author.

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Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia (Part I)

Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia (Part I)
By Josh Kurlantzick | Monday, July 02, 2007

As demonstrated by the worldwide diffusion of Chinese language, culture and policies, China has successfully marshaled its soft power — particularly among developing nations. But as Josh Kurlantzick writes, China must recognize that its growing clout may eventually engender hostility — especially in Southeast Asia.

In November 2000, Jiang Zemin made his first visit to Cambodia. Arriving at the airport in Cambodia’s capital, the normally stiff Chinese leader offered a brief greeting to his Cambodian hosts. He was whisked into a motorcade that rumbled through the streets.

But on this morning, the cityscape resembled that of a papal visit to a devoutly Catholic nation. Thousands of Cambodian children lined the streets, waving tiny Chinese flags or small photographs of Jiang’s face.

Growing Chinese influence

The kids cheered for Jiang as his open car toured through the city,

In the mid-1990s, China had tried to signal Beijing’s rising military strength to the world by moves like sending ships to disputed reefs in the South China Sea in 1995. This backfired.

chanting like he was David Beckham, rather than an elderly politician with thick glasses and an oily, swept-back hairdo.

China had quietly laid the groundwork for Jiang’s visit. Beijing had become Cambodia’s major provider of foreign aid. Chinese language programs dominated downtown Phnom Penh, and one Chinese-language school alone drew 14,000 students.

Cambodian kids who once would have headed to France or the United States for higher education now looked to universities in Shanghai.

Exerting more power

Cambodia is hardly unique. Since the late 1990s, perceptions of China across the developing world have been transformed, and countries have come to view China as a partner, and even a friend.

This transformation is partly due to a growth in China’s soft power — the attractiveness of China’s culture, diplomacy, businesses and arts.

Bad move

Until the past decade, China exerted minimal soft power. But by the late 1990s, the Chinese leadership seems to have made

In the past decade, China has marshaled its soft power by portraying itself as the natural guardian of developing countries.

a decision that its hard power was still limited. In the mid-1990s, China had tried to signal Beijing’s rising military strength to the world by moves like sending ships to disputed reefs in the South China Sea in 1995.

This backfired. “China’s provocative military exercises … frightened much of Southeast Asia,” argues Rommel C. Banlaoi, a former analyst in the Philippines’ Department of National Defense.

In the past decade, then, China has marshaled its soft power — particularly by portraying itself as the natural guardian of developing countries.

An ideal portrayal

“It was very clear that at meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, that China was looking to be the spokesperson of the Third World countries,” said Federico Macaranas, a Filipino scholar.

Another aspect of China’s appeal to developing nations involves Beijing portraying China as a potential ideal. China utilizes a model of top-down control of development in which political reform is sidelined for economic reform.

Blatant advertisement

And on visits abroad, Chinese officials do not shy away from advertising the benefits of its socioeconomic model.

In addition to a free trade agreement with Southeast Asia, Beijing is negotiating more than fifteen free trade agreements with other nations, all at the same time.

“China … has created a miracle by feeding nearly 22% of the world’s population on less than 10% of the world’s arable land. The living standards of its 1.3 billion people are constantly improving,” noted one white paper issued by the Chinese government.

As China’s engagement with the developing world has become more sophisticated, its tools of soft power have become more sophisticated as well. In the past decade, China has upgraded its public diplomacy.

Upgrading public diplomacy

China’s public diplomacy efforts reinforce the concept of peaceful development — efforts like museum exhibits in Malaysia to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the voyages of Zheng He, a Chinese admiral who sailed across the world, encountering but never conquering other nations.

Beijing also has created a Chinese version of the Peace Corps to send young Chinese on long-term volunteer service projects to developing nations like Laos.

Better diplomatic corps

China has upgraded the newswire Xinhua and expanded its output in languages other than English and Chinese — and has expanded the international broadcasting of CCTV, Chinese television.

China’s public diplomacy efforts reinforce the concept of peaceful development.

As China has upgraded its public diplomacy, it also has invested in improving its diplomatic corps. Over the past fifteen years, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to retire older diplomats, replacing them with a young generation of envoys who speak better English and local languages.

One 2005 study suggested that one-half of the country’s 4,000 diplomats are less than thirty-five years old. Consequently, top Chinese diplomats in nations like Thailand now often have done multiple rotations in those countries before rising to the rank of ambassador, developing extensive local contacts.

Encouraging Chinese culture

Promotion of Chinese culture and language are major components of this public diplomacy. Beijing now funds Confucius Institutes, Chinese-language schools created at leading local universities.

Beijing also has tried to push instruction in Mandarin and in Chinese culture in overseas primary schools, partly by signing agreements with countries like Thailand to help integrate Chinese into public schools’ curricula.

Economic influences

China’s economic tools of soft power also have become more sophisticated.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to retire older diplomats, replacing them with a young generation of envoys who speak better English and local languages.

According to a study of Chinese aid by Henry Yep of National Defense University in Washington, in 2003, China’s aid to the Philippines was roughly four times greater than U.S. aid to Manila, China’s aid to Laos was three times greater than U.S. aid — and China’s aid to Indonesia was nearly double U.S. aid.

And China’s embrace of free trade also bolsters its image. In addition to a free trade agreement with Southeast Asia, Beijing is negotiating more than fifteen free trade agreements with other nations, all at the same time.

Migrating Chinese

Finally, over the past decade the Chinese government has not only lifted restrictions on migration within China but also made it vastly easier for Chinese to leave the country for business and tourism.

Partly as a result, Chinese migration is transforming the demographic makeup of northern mainland Southeast Asia, from northern Burma to northern Vietnam. Because of outmigration, ethnic Chinese now dominate entire towns in places like Luang Namtha, in northern Laos.

Editor's Note: This feature is adapted from Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World by Josh Kurlantzick. Copyright 2007, Yale University Press. Reprinted with permission of the author.

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The Bloated Singapore Government Bureaucracy

The Bloated Singapore Government Bureaucracy

Much talk has surfaced about the PAP’s decision to create yet another unnecessary cabinet post in the form of a Second Senior Minister position along with all its attendant office entourage, and multimillion dollar budget and Minister salary. This is just another step in the long existing aim of creating new departments and positions to feed the growing legions of PAP loyalist and faithful and to reward them for past service.

Here are some other examples:

- Health Promotion Board – Exactly why was this statutory board created in the first place? Its stated goals of health promotion, disease prevention, and patient education were all handled by MOH for decades. Individual hospitals had staff on hand to do all this. At the very most, this should have been a department within the MOH. Instead, it now has its own building, staff, and Board of Directors. An examination of members of its Board of Directors shows only 2 medical professionals, and the board is populated by PAP luminaries such as Oon Jin Teik (Singapore Sports Council), Lucas Chow (Mediacorp), Wen Khai Meng (Capitaland), etc. Yet another total waste of taxpayer money.

- Health Sciences Agency – See above for the same reasons.

- DSTA – This is indeed a huge mystery as to why this organization was even set up to begin with. Its stated goal is to acquire weapons systems for the SAF, like the Boeing F-15SG fighter plane. Is the govt. telling us that the RSAF is so incompetent that it cannot evaluate aircraft for itself, and that it needs an organization like the DSTA to do so? It’s also supposed to develop military infrastructure. Why? Is the SAF not able to do that itself? DSTA also provides engineering and related services in defence areas. Are they saying that SYT Engineering is not capable of doing this? In fact, for every stated mission of the DSTA, some organization is already doing the same mission. I know of no other country in the world that allows a civilian agency to evaluate, dictate, and purchase what weapons its military would use. The only other conclusion that I reach is that is yet another PAP feeding trough.

- Workforce development Agency – This to me should be just another Ministry of Labour department. Helping people to get job, upgrading their skills, etc. is what the Ministry of Labour is supposed to do anyway. This should be under the umbrella of the MOL and should be eliminated. It’s just duplicating infrastructure and overlapping with the MOL’s aims and objectives.

These are just some of the glaring examples that I see. There are many more. The PAP always harps about how Singapore should be more competitive. Yet, by having in placed this bloated bureaucracy, they are sending the wrong message…

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Dr Allan Ooi’s case: MINDEF’s second letter still did not answer key questions

Dr Allan Ooi’s case: MINDEF’s second letter still did not answer key questions

In a report published on Straits Times titled “MINDEF clarifies SAF doctor’s scholarship bond“, the ministry said it would have preferred to keep such exchanges private out of respect for Capt (Dr) Ooi and his family. However, it said an earlier letter by the family had raised ’several issues’, and it was necessary to clarify them. (read article here)

It appeared that MINDEF is insinuating that the open letter sent to the media by the Ooi family was inappropriate. I believed that the family of Dr Allan Ooi would have preferred to keep such exchanges private too. If MINDEF has been open and upfront with them in the first place, would they resort to such a desperate measure?

MINDEF said a board of inquiry was convened on 11 March 2009 and it concluded that matters related to Capt (Dr) Ooi’s service ‘were managed appropriately’. I am surprised at the swift conclusion reached by the board of inquiry.

May I ask MINDEF the following questions:

1. Who make up the board of inquiry?

2. How long did they take to reach the conclusion?

3. What was the conclusion?

4. How were the matters relating to Dr Ooi’s service “managed appropriately”?

5. Was the family informed of the result of the inquiry.

The impression given by MINDEF is that the board of inquiry was staffed by its own officers whose aim is to clear Allan’s superiors of any wrongdoings rather than to investigate the matter thoroughly.

Straits Times’ title is both misleading and untrue. Nowhere did MINDEF clarify Allan’s scholarship bond at all other than to justify the actions taken in response to Allan’s request to quit SAF.

The crux of the entire matter is this: Allan wrote in to SAF expressing his intention to quit and MINDEF has persistently refused to answer the key question as to why Allan was not allowed to break his bond?

What constitutes “early release” under MINDEF’s operating guidelines? If Allan was allowed to break his bond, he would have to serve out one year of his mandatory national service as a SAF medical officer after which he would be allowed to join the civil sector to complete his remaining 3 years of bond.

There are many interpretations of “early release” and MINDEF should come clean with the public on its definition instead of hiding behind vague military jargons to evade public scrutiny. Does “early release” mean the officer can only allowed to leave SAF after a period of time? If so, how long is the duration - 2, 3, 5 or 10 years?

For an officer who is determined to quit SAF, is it fair to coerce him to wait for his “early release”? All MINDEF needs to do is to tell us truthfully if Allan was allowed to break his bond.

What transpired between Allan and his superiors? Was he told in no uncertain terms that he is not allowed to break his bond? What is the rationale of offering him an alternative posting within SAF when he had no desire to remain with the organization? These relevant and important questions can only be answered with an independent panel vested with the power to haul up the officers involved for questioning.

MINDEF should stop obsfucating the issue by using a moral compass to denounce Allan’s intention to break his bond. While it is true that Allan has the moral obligation to complete his bond, he had the means to compensate MINDEF financially for the resources they had spent on him.

On the other hand, MINDEF also owes a moral obligation to its scholarship holders to ensure they have a fruitful and rewarding career in the SAF. Why continue to keep a scholar whose heart is no longer with the organization? Is it fair for taxpayers to continue paying the salary of a soldier who is dying to get out of the army?

MINDEF has also failed to disclose the original terms of Allan’s contract with the SAF: is there a clause in the bond that he is NOT PERMITTED to break his bond at any time in the course of his service?

An unbreakable bond is tantamount to modern slavery. If there were no such clause initially, why should Allan be refused his basic human right to leave his current employment in search of a better one?

Until MINDEF manage to answer these questions satisfactorily, Allan’s scholarship bond will never be clarified. MINDEF should have heeded the family’s wishes to allow an independent panel to be set up to investigate the matter a long time ago. Its reluctance to do so will only lead to more baseless speculations about its role in Allan’s fateful decision to go AWOL and turning this sorry episode into a protracted fracas.

If MINDEF truly have any respect for Allan and his family, it should address their concerns immediately instead of continuing to play a cat-and-mouse game with them. There can be no closure without answers.

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Concerned about procedures for reporting food poisoning cases

Concerned about procedures for reporting food poisoning cases

Thursday, 9 April 2009

Gerald Giam

I am very concerned over what seems to be a lack of efficient procedures in place to avert mass public health tragedies like the recent Geylang Serai rojak stall food poisoning incident.

Three lives have been lost (including one unborn baby), and 146 people have been affected by the food contamination, 48 of whom were hospitalised.

CNA reported that stall patrons started to fall sick between April 2nd (Thu) and 4th (Sat) with food poisoning symptoms such as severe abdominal cramps, vomiting, and diarrhoea. However it was only at 8 am on Sat April 4th that officials from the National Environment Agency (NEA) arrived to shut down the stall.

In another CNA report, a 44-year old woman said she and her mother stopped at the rojak stall for lunch on Friday, and less than six hours later, both women were vomiting and had stomach cramps so severe an ambulance rushed them to Changi General Hospital (CGH). They said it was “mayhem” there and that “there was a huge crowd, many of them holding their stomachs and appearing in pain… I asked around whether they also ate rojak from that stall. They all said yes.”

The woman who miscarried had eaten at the stall on Friday afternoon. She said the rojak smelled unusual, but carried on eating it.

Why did it take so long for NEA to shut down the stall? If people started to fall sick on Thursday, why was the stall allowed to remain open for the entire Friday?

The NEA graded the stall’s hygiene with a “C” grade back in December. While I do not expect NEA officers to check on the stall every day, given the barely passing grade the stall achieved, I feel it deserved tighter scrutiny from health officials.

One 54-year old housewife said that “environment in the centre (Geylang Serai temporary market) is not very clean. Sometimes there is rubbish around and it is very near to the wet market.”

More importantly, surely there should have been a more efficient mechanism to alert NEA of a stall selling contaminated food. Did the doctors that the victims visited on Thursday report the food poisoning cases to NEA immediately after attending to their patients? Is there even a mechanism to do so?

This serves as a lesson that all cases of food poisoning should be taken very seriously. Victims of food poisoning will almost always know the source of their infection. If doctors are required by law to inform the Ministry of Health when they diagnose infectious diseases like SARS, they should also be required to report any cases of food poisoning to the NEA immediately.

The moment a report is made, NEA officers should be activated immediately to investigate the stall or restaurant, and shut it down if necessary to prevent further cases of poisoning. While this could be quite a strain on resources, it is a necessary investment in the interest of public health.

At the same time, there should be an efficient way for consumers to report contaminated food. Not all food poisoning victims visit doctors, and many would detect bad food from its smell before consuming it. There should be a website or hotline for people to report such incidences easily. A general number or website feedback form does not really suffice, given the urgency in which such reports must be acted upon.

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Gold ain't what it was in Goldfinger

Gold ain't what it was in Goldfinger

Gold is no longer what it used to be when Ian Fleming wrote Goldfinger or Sean Connery starred in the film with Honor Blackman playing Pussy Galore in 1964.

Consider the plot: Goldfinger plans to steal the gold in Fort Knox.

What's at stake is the entire world economy.

For Fort Knox contains the American gold pile that underwrites the global monetary system.

That was really true back then.

The price of gold was fixed at $35 an ounce.

The US government was committed to converting dollars into gold at that price. That was part of the Bretton Woods international monetary system introduced at the end of the Second World War. There were fixed currency exchange rates pegged to the dollar and gold.

Goldfinger's plan to steal the gold from Fort Knox threatened to wreck the international monetary system. Of course, he was in league with the nefarious SMERSH, the Soviet counterintelligence agency.

Now the Russians along with the Chinese want the dollar replaced with a new global reserve currency.

But that's another story – for the dollar is no longer what it used to be, nor is the gold.

The Nixon revolution

The man who changed it all – President Richard Nixon.

He is now remembered for the Watergate scandal and pingpong diplomacy bringing America and China together.

But Nixon also changed the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1971. He "decoupled" the dollar from the gold, abandoning the commitment to convert gold into dollars at $35 an ounce.

That affected the entire monetary system.

Why did Nixon do it?

Because US gold reserves were down and America was on the verge of running its first trade deficit in more than 75 years, says Wikipedia. The US dollar was overpriced and other currencies such as the Japanese yen undervalued. The fixed exchange rate did not reflect the strength of currencies such as Japan's which had flourished on trade with America.

The former Economist editor Bill Emmott describes the background – the Vietnam war, political friction between America and Japan on trade matters – that led to the change and its effect on Japan.

Bill Emmott writes in Rivals: How The Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, published last year:

In 1970 Japan's investment rate was at its peak at 40% of GDP; its rapid industrial growth was causing severe problems of pollution; its current account surplus grew to more than 2% of GDP, and its currency came to look especially undervalued. That surplus sounds small by today's Chinese standards. But at the time, exchange rates were fixed against the dollar and gold under the system agreed at Bretton Woods at the end of the Second World War, and capital did not move as freely as it does now, making surpluses and deficits as large as China's and America's of 2000-2007 simply impossible. But, in 1968-71, Japan's surplus and America's deficit still caused a considerable amount of political friction, as America struggled to finance its war in Vietnam.

It was in 1971 that Japan's enjoyment of a fixed and undervalued yen came to a sudden end when President Richard Nixon unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods system and forced other countries to negotiate revaluations of their exchange rates with the dollar. That shock for Japan was followed by a second blow, the sharp hike in oil prices thanks to the Arab oil embargo in 1973, which also caused inflation in Japan. The combination of those two shocks forced a change: investment gradually came to play a smaller part in the Japanese economy, industry moved upmarket and out of low-tech goods, and a sizeable public deficit was used to support the economy during the transition.

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