Singapore’s Shame (Chapter 3 - Singapore’s political history)
By Dr James Gomez, Author, Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame
The present state of political culture in Singapore is the accumulated result of a one-party rule by the PAP. It is a culture breed via the control, suppression and persecution articulators of alternative political expression and action. The development of this political culture can be understood by tracing the island`s historical connection to the Riau Sultanate and how it evolved into the current polity.
During the times of the Sultanate, it was a loose system of patronage that allowed different hierarchies of authority to co-exist. Apart from the royalty, there were village chieftains and pirate chiefs. As long as the weaker paid tribute to the stronger, there was much autonomy within various nexuses of power. Authority was often enforced according to military strength.
The arrival of the British altered this arrangement significantly. After neutralising royal and village authority over the island through the signing of a treaty, the centre of final authority shifted to the colonial representative in 1819. There were several changes in the following years in the reporting authority of the different colonial sub-jurisdictions in the region.
Nonetheless, political authority and sovereignty of the island were effectively in the hands of the crown or its representatives. As long as the natives or immigrants did not directly pose a political threat or become a source of inconvenience to the colonial agenda, there was ample room for political expression at the local and community level.
The British were primarily concerned with the entrepot trade and their strategic interests. Thus, social, cultural and religious organisations and concerns were allowed to exist and operate (Lee and Chiew, 1991). From 1900 to 1941 much of the politics that did not directly affect British interests was allowed to operate unhindered. For instance, the Chinese focused on developments in mainland China, and the Indians - who were active slightly later - had their interest rooted to the independence movement developing in India.
The Malays, following Islamic revivalism and developments in Malaysia, Middle East and Indonesia, were concerned with issues affecting their community. Evidence of visits by representatives from abroad of different political persuasions that contributed to the “homeland” interest of local and migrant communities’ show that political expression was relatively free. Many of these political activists were able to organise and advocate for their various causes.
The presence of a politically censorial behaviour was largely insignificant and has not been recorded as an issue in much of Singapore’s early history. This is different now. Unlike the migrants` experience of Singapore`s early history, the PAP government in contemporary times has instead taken action to curb the homeland interests of settled migrants, new migrants and resident workers in Singapore such as the Sikhs, Burmese and Falun Gong activists to name a few incidents.
The situation of political laissez-faire changed in 1942, when war broke out and the Japanese occupied Singapore for three and a half years. The limited tolerance of the new imperial masters was clear. The Chinese were systematically persecuted and were not allowed to organise in any way. They were only allowed some limited organisational opportunities towards the end of the war, out of Japanese necessity.
The Malay and Indian communities were treated differently: they were allowed to organise with the blessing of the Japanese under the scheme of Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Indians were assisted in setting up the Indian National Army. The Malay community was allowed to retain its leadership over religious matters pertaining to Islam. This was possible because the Japanese saw such political provision for these two communities as commensurate with their own political agenda of combating Western colonial interests across the Causeway and in India.
While the Japanese kept a tight fist on things, given their political plan at that time, Singapore was used as a hub to organise or co-host meetings on the Greater Indonesia-Malaysia project. Japanese military and co-ordination activities with their political allies abroad were also conducted on the island. However, in spite of the special condition accorded to the minority communities, alternative political expression and action under the Japanese military regime was generally heavily circumscribed. There were mass arrests, massacres, suspension of habeas corpus, torture during interrogation and fear was induced among people in Singapore that they could be taken away at anytime.
There was self-censorship due to the plethora of informants that reported on individuals and organisations. The situation created an anxiety from fear, similar to that detectable now in contemporary Singapore. However, the basic fear apparatus has been expanded and built upon by the PAP government.
The end of the Japanese occupation and the return of the British resulted in more opportunities for political expression. The eroded myth of British invincibility, the desire on the part of the British to push for some kind of local political autonomy that might be favourable to British interests as well as the euphoria following the removal of strict Japanese control over the people led to a rise in the number of political parties.
The space to organise and contest local elections became bigger after the British introduced new laws to facilitate elections. The opportunity for greater political expression was also in part aided by the presence of a free press. The leftist elements, however, had a tougher time as the British were especially restrictive towards the communists and their activities.
The British placed restrictions on trade unions, declared an Emergency, banned the Malayan Communist Party and allowed preventive detention of communists. Thus political freedoms were biased towards non-communists and pro-British elements. It made the communists cautious but it did not prevent them from taking risks. A similar strategy of bias has also been adopted by the PAP in contemporary Singapore. You will find that “neutrals”, those advocating “non-partisanship”, conservatives and pro-PAP elements are encouraged, given more political space to manoeuvre or are not actively persecuted. This is different from those who directly oppose the PAP or pursue regime change.
In the mid 50s, partly to check the communist elements, but also due to developments in British Malaya and the desire to safeguard British interests, more space was accorded to local political parties that were to pave the way for self-government in Singapore. There was contest for elections and the media was free to report on events. There was space to organise politics and to go about such business without being under undue pressure to conform, in spite of the British agenda. Even when the PAP, under Lee Kuan Yew, managed self-government in 1959 and was taking political action against opponents, the situation was still fluid. It was a period where fear and the practice of self-censorship were not overriding issues.
Historical narratives represent those times as being quite unlike the Japanese occupation and contemporary Singapore. This state of political affairs remained the case until 1965 when the Republic separated from the Malaysia Federation. The Barisan Socialis, a pro-communist split from the PAP, failing to influence the earlier decision towards merger with Malaysia in 1963, abandoned parliament and decided to take their struggle to the streets.
Barisan’s decision to leave parliament paved the way for the PAP to take effective control of the country. Starting from arrests and detention of political actors in the 60s, it began to get rid of its political opponents and consolidated power. Since the mid ‘1960s, the PAP has encroached into every sector of the country. In politics, it has brought the grassroots organisations under its ambit and consolidated the political elite. The People’s Association with its Residents’ Committees, Community Clubs, Central Committees and now Community Development Centres give it a powerful grassroots reach. That apex of such grassroots structures are headed by a PAP MP or party member makes the link between the party and the grassroots organisations concrete.
Similarly, trade unions were brought under the control of the NTUC through arrests, intimidation, legislation and politicking. Great concern is placed on worker control and how they channel their disgruntlements. The party by penetrating almost every work place and including management level workers onboard the union structure maintains an effective reach over workers. Similarly the trade union movement is often headed a by minister, MP or party member. By displacing civil leaders traditionally occupied these and other networks, the PAP, through its cadres and party members, directly controls the machinery for political mobilisation. On the labour front, the PAP`s contemporary concern is how to manage the rise in foreign workers since 2000s as their numbers increase and problems emerge with regards to working conditions, pay and other entitlements.
Through the introduction of legislation and penalties, it has also reduced both local and foreign press’ ability to comment freely on local politics. The local press was, through a series of legislation, eventually amalgamated under Singapore Press Holdings. Along the way, the PAP accused family owned newspapers of meddling politics and others of receiving foreign funds, or of meddling in local politics on behalf of foreign powers. Legislation has been used to effectively control all aspects of information flow. It has placed special restrictions on foreign stations based in Singapore, which prevents them from giving any political party a media advantage during elections. In this way, the ruling party can block media from airing opposition views, while maintaining its hegemony through the local media.
The freedom of speech within Parliament has been seriously eroded by amendments to the Parliamentary (Privileges, Immunity Powers) Act, 1986 in reaction to former opposition parliamentarian JB Jeyaratnam`s persistent questioning in parliament. Apart from stiffening penalties for “abuse” of the privilege of free speech in parliament, it enables the traditional immunity of a parliamentary member from legal action to be removed if he is thought to have abused his privilege of free speech. The existence of this provision undermines the principle that at least in Parliament speech must be free.
Libel laws in Singapore are restrictive compared to countries like the UK, Australia, New Zealand and India, all of which have extended and developed defences to libel action where the individual allegedly defamed is a political figure whose political conduct is in question. However, these laws have been relied on by PAP leaders in numerous law suits against political opponents. International human rights NGOs and lawyers` associations have issued statements and spoken out against using libel suits to cripple political dissent in Singapore.
Political opponents of the PAP have been detained without trial throughout its stay in power. A high profile series of arrests took place in 1987, when 22 people were detained for being part of an alleged Marxist conspiracy. The detainees went through psychological and physical torture and many continue to be traumatised after their release. Connected to the incident, lawyer for the detainees, Francis Seow was also detained and later found guilty of tax evasions. Many associated in the periphery of the Marxist conspiracy, but never detained, continue to exercise extreme caution and to some extent are a source of self-censorship that continues to permeate onto emerging Singapore civil society.
Other individuals such as Chee Soon Juan and Tang Lian Hong who took the political party route and contested in local by-elections and general elections, separately became targets of PAP`s negative campaigning and legal suits. A compliant local media were ready partners in the PAP`s smear campaign. Both individuals lost much money and in the case of Chee, he later was bankrupted through the lawsuits. Additionally, Chee based in Singapore and active in opposition politics needs to continuously manage negative perceptions instilled into a sizeable portion of the local and foreign population in Singapore and abroad.
The PAP government has also used legislation and rhetoric to keep distinct religious, social and cultural groups out of political matters. This followed in the wake of the Marxist conspiracy, when the PAP tried to separate religious institutions and politics as it did not want an alternative grassroots base to form outside the one that it controlled through its network in the People’s Association and NTUC. In 1999 Fateha.com was founded to air Muslim views and issues online, but soon events escalated. In 2002, its CEO, Zulfikar Mohamad Sharif was investigated for
criminal defamation for making online comments against PAP leaders and its associates (see Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff 2004). Zulfikar, fled to Melbourne in 2002 and has been living there since (accurate during the time of writing).
Changes to the electoral law have been another tool of control for the PAP government. Apart from the constant gerrymandering that served to weaken strong opposition wards and techniques used to gauge voting sent more accurately, it introduced the Group Representative Constituency, which has been expanded from three to six members each. This has effectively reduced the single constituency to nine out of 83 seats in parliament. Three Non-Constituency MPs were constituted to provide supplementary seats for the opposition in the event that there was no opposition candidate elected to parliament during a general election.
Nominated MPs adopted at the start of each parliament following general elections stand at nine for a multiple of two-year terms. Through these mechanisms the ruling PAP has sought to provide for a semblance of alternative voices, minus their political weight and the threat they may pose to its hegemony. Another electoral innovation was the introduction of the Elected President and the first election held in 1993. Implicit in this institution was its role as a check on the executive. However, this was soon reduced to a “custodial” role, when it was shown that
the powers of the president if creatively used can be a source of a “hindrance to the ruling party. Since, 1993, there has not been a contest for the Elected President. The PAP government appointed Presidential Elections Committee has to date disqualified all but one candidate.
There have been attempts also to foster a certain kind of political culture through ideological means from the late 1980s. Following incursions of a two digit vote swing against the ruling party in the mid-eighties onwards, a grand debate on Confucianism finally culminated in the formulation of Asian values that was widely promoted as Shared Values. Via this ideology, the party advocated non-adversarial politics and denounced liberal democracy as alien to Eastern culture. It attempted to legitimise an Asian democracy that would allow the PAP to be ideologically hegemonic and justify its high-handedness in politics.
The use of public consultation mechanisms to gather people and collect their views has been a PAP tool to demonstrate that it listens to its citizens. Permanent mechanisms such as the Feedback Unit (its approach modified over the years) plus one-off national consultations such as the Singapore 21 initiative (The Singapore Government, 1999) or the Remaking Singapore Committee set up in 2002 are part of such efforts. Many Singaporeans do take part earnestly in these exercises only to find out that in the end what is crucial and missing in reports from these consultations is the absence of a clear statement on political reform. Such exercises only confirm the truth that at the end of the day it is difficult to include meaningful political reform ideas via these consultation mechanisms.
Since the mid 1990s, the PAP government has been increasingly having to contend with online and offline civil disobedience. Developments in information technology offer new opportunities for political expression, dissemination and mobilisation making many of the existing rules of political control redundant. However, the PAP government`s response has been nevertheless to try to control it. But such controls have become problematic because of resistance to such laws. Many have anonymously distributed alternative political content online in spite of restrictions. Hence, resistance has led to online civil disobedience. This in turn has also to some extent also let to a limited amount of public offline civil disobedience acts further adding to and widening the depth of civil
disobedience in post-independence Singapore. The internet has forced the PAP to concede some ground and it has “liberalised” that it can no longer control. Nevertheless, the PAP endeavours to control as much as it can especially with regards to offline civil disobedience acts. It has introduced stiffer penalties and conditions to such acts and tightened rules on distribution of online political video content.
The attempt to control, in particular, alternative political expression has paved the way for a narrow definition of politics in Singapore. It has legitimised the type of political activity that the ruling party willing to condone. Such a condition has given rise to a recognisable political culture in Singapore - one that has problems with alternative political expression. But it has also given rise to another approach to politics called the neutral or non-partisan approach. The next chapter explains the rise of non-partisan ship and how this has contributed to self-censorship in Singapore.
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